Case Citation: Chisholm v. Valemount Forest Products Ltd., 2025 BCCA 48

Background Facts

The Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle on the Canoe West Forest Service Road when he hit a log on the roadway. He filed a claim for personal injury and property damage against Valemount Forest Products (permitted user of the road) and the Province of British Columbia (owner of the road). The Province sought summary dismissal of the claim against it and the BCSC granted the application.

The Immunity Provision

The Province relied on the statutory immunity from liability conferred on it by the Industrial Roads Act, RSBC 1996 (the “Act”), which states that:

Liability of industrial road operator

24 (1) In an action for indemnity for damages or injury sustained because of construction or operation of an industrial road, the defendants may 

(a) plead the general issue, 

(b) give this Act and the special matter in evidence at the trial, and 

(c) prove that the damages or injury alleged were done under this Act. 

(2) No inspection under this Act, nothing in this Act and nothing done or ordered or omitted to be done or ordered, under this Act, relieves an industrial road administrator of or from or diminishes or affects any liability or responsibility resting on it, either toward Her Majesty or toward a person, or the spouse, parent or child, executor or administrator, heir or personal representative, of a person, for anything done or omitted to be done by the industrial road administrator, or for a wrongful act, neglect or default, misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance of the industrial road administrator. 

(3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), a person using a road, . . . is not entitled to indemnity or compensation from the owner or licensee of the road or from Her Majesty in right of the Province for loss, damage, injury or expense caused by the condition of the road or a work that is part of it, . . .. [emphasis added]

The Appeal:

The Plaintiff appealed. Justice Horsman, for the Court of Appeal found the chambers judge had erred in his interpretation of the meaning of the word “road” within the Act. In fact the Act only immunized the Province from liability for industrial roads, which the Canoe West Forest Service Road was not, forest service roads being expressly excluded from the meaning of industrial road.

The Relevant Definitions

“industrial road” means a road on Crown or private land used primarily for transportation by motor vehicle of 

(a) natural resources, whether raw, processed or manufactured, or 

(b) machinery, materials or personnel, 

and includes all bridges, wharves, log dumps and works forming a part of the road, but does not include 

(c) a highway, 

(d) a forest service road as defined in the Forest Act, […] 

“industrial road administrator” means a person who constructs, owns or operates an industrial road; […] 

“road” means a strip of ground, used for travel by motor vehicles, that is not a highway; [emphasis added]

Principles of Statutory Interpretation

The Court of Appeal set out the well-known general principles of statutory interpretation, that the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27.

In applying those principles, the Court of Appeal said:

Text and Context: the Legislature’s use of the singular word “road” in Section 24(3) did not signal an intent for the immunity to apply to roads other than industrial roads. The words of s24(3) cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the section, which is concerned with liability of an industrial road administrator and in connection to the operation of an industrial road, and which creates a general liability for negligent acts or omissions. In light of that wording, s. 24(3) could only be read as creating an immunity from liability that would otherwise arise under ss. 24(1) or 24(2). 

Additionally, the heading of the section indicates the Legislature intended the provision to refer to an industrial road. While headings are not determinative, they can act as intrinsic aids to interpretation.

The Broader Statutory Context: a reading of the whole Act suggests the Legislature intended to regulate the operation of industrial roads, and to limit the immunity to industrial roads. There is nothing indicating an intention to confer immunity on all owners and operators of all private roads in the Province. The principle that statutes dealing with similar subjects ought to be coherent means the Province’s proposed interpretation would undermine the comprehensive provincial occupier’s liability scheme. Interpretations which promote harmony should prevail over discordant interpretations. 

Historical Context: the first form of the immunity went back to 1963 and was directed at possible legislative change to facilitate the recreational use of, and general public access to, private roads. The immunity was enacted to alleviate concerns of the owners of those private roads about the liability associated with the public’s use of their roads, thereby encouraging industry operators to permit public access. On the Province’s proposed interpretation this highly specialized regime a general immunity provision would become available to the owners and operators of all private roads, driveways, and parking lots across British Columbia for injuries caused by unsafe conditions and there was nothing to indicate that was the legislative intention. 

Summary and Takeaways

The Legislature intended s. 24(3) to apply only to industrial roads. The Canoe West Forest Service Road was not an industrial road and the immunity was not available to the Province. The Summary Dismissal Order was set aside.

The case provides a refresher on the principles of statutory interpretation and the need to carefully consider the text in harmony with the surrounding context and broader legislative intention in mind.