On May 15, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a brand-new tort. In Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia^[1], a 5-1-3 decision recognized a novel intentional tort of intimate partner violence (the “IPV”). Plaintiffs no longer have to fit coercive and controlling conduct into older torts like assault or intentional infliction of emotional distress; they now have a cause of action built for it. This article proceeds in two parts. Part I summarizes the case: the facts, the elements of the new tort, and why the majority concluded the existing torts were inadequate. Part II turns to coverage and defence considerations: which exclusions apply, where the live coverage fights are likely to be, and what to expect next.

1. Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia in Brief

Background

Mr. and Ms. Ahluwalia were married for sixteen years. During the marriage, Mr. Ahluwalia engaged in sustained abusive conduct, including three discrete acts of extreme physical violence, and a wide array of more subtle forms of manipulation: humiliation, intimidation, isolation from family members, sexual abuse, and financial control. The trial judge characterized the relationship as a “16-year pattern of coercion and control” and found that Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct was intended to break Ms. Ahluwalia’s will and condition her to obey him.

The Ontario Superior Court recognized a new tort of “family violence” and awarded $150,000 in damages, including a punitive component, indicating Ms. Ahluwalia would have made the same award under assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress in the alternative. The Court of Appeal rejected the new tort, set aside the punitive damages, and reduced the award to $100,000 under the existing torts. Mr. Ahluwalia conceded liability at the appellate level.

The main issues

• Do existing torts (assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress) adequately address coercive and controlling conduct in an intimate relationship?
• Should the common law recognize a new tort of intimate partner violence, and if so, on what elements?

SCC decision

Kasirer J., for the majority, recognized a new intentional tort of intimate partner violence. Karakatsanis J. concurred in the result but would have framed the tort more broadly, capturing any act or threat of violence causing physical or psychological harm. Jamal J., joined by Côté and Rowe JJ., dissented on the basis that existing torts were sufficient.

The test

To establish liability, a plaintiff must prove three elements:

1. The abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath;
2. The defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct; and
3. The conduct, on an objective measure, constitutes coercive control. 

Like many intentional torts, the new tort is actionable without proof of damages, because the “dignitary harm” flows from the intentional wrong itself.^[2] The extent of the harm remains relevant to the amount of compensatory damages.

So, what exactly counts as “coercive control”?

The tort is not limited to physical violence or psychological abuse. It may undermine autonomy in other insidious ways, such as “tactics of isolation, manipulation, humiliation, surveillance, economic abuse, sexual coercion, and intimidation that can control and entrap intimate partners.”^[3] The scholarly literature on coercive control, cited in the decision, also defines coercive control as a "strategy of domination" that entraps victims through micro-regulation of everyday life, isolation, and economic subordination.

Why was a new tort justified?

The answer is a qualitatively different wrong and a qualitatively different harm that the new tort compensates. Unlike existing torts, it seeks to compensate for a wrong of coercive control and a harm of the loss of dignity, autonomy, and equality within an intimate relationship.

Also, the key innovation is that the tort focuses on pattern, not incident. Unlike traditional battery (which requires proof of a specific physical touching) or intentional infliction of emotional distress (which requires proof of particular outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress), the IPV includes and extends beyond discrete acts and asks whether the defendant’s conduct, viewed as a whole, operated as a pattern.

2. What This Means for Liability Insurers

Ahluwalia changes the cause of action, not the policy. From a coverage perspective, claims brought under the new tort will face significant exclusion issues. Personal lines policies, including homeowner, renter, and umbrella policies, usually contain exclusions that may be directly engaged by this type of claim, including:

• Intentional act exclusions: The new tort requires intention as an element, so this exclusion is engaged almost by definition.
• Criminal act exclusions: Depending on the facts, the same conduct may also be criminal (assault, threats, stalking, confinement, sexual coercion, or harassment).
• Household member exclusions: In the usual intimate-partner scenario, the survivor will be a co-insured living in the same household. However, there might be scenarios where the statutory "innocent co-insured" rule in BC and Alberta would be applicable.
• Abuse or harassment exclusions: Some policies also explicitly exclude claims arising from physical, sexual, psychological, or emotional abuse, molestation, harassment, or similar conduct. 

What uncertainties remain, and where might coverage opinions be needed?

Although these exclusions will dispose of most files, coverage outcomes will still turn on the specific policy wording and the circumstances of each claim. Several areas are likely to generate ongoing coverage disputes; the list below is illustrative, not exhaustive:

• Duty to defend: Even where indemnity is unlikely, insurers should review the pleadings and policy wording carefully. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify - it is triggered by what the plaintiff has pleaded, not by what is ultimately proven at trial.^[4] For this reason, plaintiffs have long pleaded intentional conduct as negligence to access liability coverage. This pattern will likely repeat with IPV claims. Importantly, in this reality, courts have to look past the labels in a pleading to the true substance of what is being alleged.^[5] Where the pleaded facts show intentional harm, a parallel negligence claim is normally treated as "derivative" of the intentional conduct and excluded with it.^[6] However, where the pleadings are ambiguous as to whether the harm was caused intentionally or negligently, the negligence claim may not be derivative, and the duty to defend may still attach.  
• Wording interpretation: Each file will require a careful review of the actual policy wording. Many older intentional-act exclusions were drafted with physical or psychiatric injury in mind and may not map neatly onto all forms of IPV conduct. Tactics such as financial surveillance, isolation, and restriction of communication may give plaintiffs room to argue that not every aspect of coercive control falls within the exclusion. As always, the analysis will turn on the specific wording. Remember that any ambiguity in an exclusion clause is construed against the insurer.
• Intent as to the act versus consequences: Intentional-act exclusions are ordinarily read as requiring intent as to the act, not as to the precise degree of harm that follows. A defendant cannot generally escape the exclusion by arguing that the harm was more serious than what was intended. That said, as with all exclusion-clause analysis, the wording of the particular clause is important: exclusions framed around “intentional injury” (rather than “intentional act”) may leave more room to argue for coverage where the consequences exceeded what was contemplated.
• Negligence claims against other household members. The alleged abuser may not be the only defendant. As has long happened in other intentional tort cases, plaintiffs in IPV files may also sue other household members for negligence in failing to prevent the abuse. Those claims may raise a separate duty-to-defend issue even where the abuser’s intentional conduct is clearly excluded. The wording is (again) crucial here. For example, in W.-V. (T.) v. W. (K.R.J.),^[7] the court found that an intentional-act exclusion for acts of "the insured" preserved the duty to defend a mother sued for negligently failing to prevent her partner's sexual abuse of her child. The same exclusion, phrased as "an insured," has ended that duty. A single article ("the" versus "an") can determine whether the policy responds.
• Limitation periods: The default limitation period for intentional torts in most provinces is two years. Plaintiffs will likely also invoke the rolling-tort doctrine since the novel tort focuses on a pattern. Further, some provinces have removed limitation periods for claims relating to assault or battery against an intimate partner. The IPV, however, extends beyond assault and battery, making it unclear whether the exemption applies to the new tort.

Looking Ahead

Ahluwalia is the beginning, not the end. The majority’s recognition of patterned conduct as an independent legal wrong, and of the loss of dignity, autonomy, and equality as a qualitatively different harm, will likely be tested beyond the family-law context. One obvious area is the workplace, where insurers writing EPL, D&O, and institutional general liability policies should expect attempts to frame harassment, bullying, abuse of power, or toxic workplace conduct as a broader pattern of coercion and control. Another area is privacy, where allegations may involve surveillance, monitoring, control of communications, misuse of personal information, or technology-facilitated abuse. The prudent step is to review current policy language and exclusions now, with these arguments in mind, rather than after they have been pleaded against a particular insured.

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

This publication is intended for general information only and should not be relied on as legal advice. Legal advice should be obtained based on your specific circumstances. If you have questions about the topics discussed, please contact the author.