Introduction: Vicarious Liability and Family Use of Vehicles

In Rowan v Kramer, 2025 ABKB 306, the Alberta Court of King’s Bench contemplated a fundamental question of vicarious liability: Under what circumstances does a vehicle owner become legally responsible for damages caused by a family member’s operation of their vehicle? The Rowan decision involved a 14-year-old Defendant, Payton Kramer, who crashed a pick-up truck, owned by her uncle and Co-Defendant, Martin Kramer. The Plaintiffs argued Martin should be held vicariously liable for the Accident under Section 187 of the Alberta Traffic Safety Act, RSA 2000, c T-6. Though their arguments were ultimately dismissed, Justice Mandziuk offered instructive insight into how courts consider questions of vicarious liability between family members. 

Background: A Midnight Joyride Gone Wrong

On the day of the Accident, Martin was out of town on a work assignment and Payton had been dropped off at Martin’s house to spend time with his daughter, her cousin Jordan. Payton and Jordan were one year apart in age and frequently had sleepovers, shared clothes, and commuted to school together. Around midnight, Jordan suggested they take Martin’s truck and drive out to the community mailbox. At the time, Payton held a Learner’s Permit license and had never driven a vehicle unaccompanied by an adult. Jordan, who had recently turned 14, had never driven a vehicle and did not have a Learner’s Permit. 

Jordan retrieved the keys from their hiding spot in a kitchen cupboard and the two girls headed out to Martin’s truck. Jordan started the truck and began driving into town, with Payton in the front passenger seat. Halfway to the mailbox, Jordan began to feel nervous, so her and Payton agreed to return to Martin’s house. Considering Payton had more driving experience, Jordan offered Payton the driver’s seat. Payton was driving the truck when the Accident occurred. 

The Legal Framework: Section 187 of the Traffic Safety Act

Section 187 protects parties who incur damage in a motor vehicle accident as a result of the action of a driver who is not the owner of the vehicle involved. It assigns vicarious liability on a vehicle’s owner in two scenarios: 1) If the driver was living with and as a member of the owner’s family, or 2) If the driver was operating the vehicle with the owner’s express or implied consent. The Rowan Plaintiffs advanced arguments for both. 

Were They Living ‘As a Family’?

The court first considered the familial relationship between Payton and Martin. Leading up to the Accident, Payton had spent nearly every day at Martin’s house, spending the first weeks of the summer holidays with Jordan. The following factors were cited as precedential considerations in established that a driver was “living with and as a family member”:

• The driver was residing with the owner with a degree of permanency or is the permanent residence of the driver; 
• The driver was staying in the residence as a boarder; 
• During their residency, the driver had acquired the status of member of the family unit; 
• The public perceived the relationship to be familial.

That said, being related by blood, living with the owner without paying rent, unrestricted access to the owner’s residence, and the owner feeling responsible for the welfare of the driver were deemed elements neither necessary nor sufficient to establish the driver was “living as a member of the family.”  

Blood is Not Enough: Limits of Familial Connection

Despite Payton and Jordan enjoying a sisterly relationship, Payton had her own home with her older sister, no assigned bedroom at Martin’s house, and no financial or domestic obligations tying her to his household. Further, there was no parental relationship or paternal understanding between Payton and Martin. Justice Mandziuk noted that while a close relationship might sometimes blur the lines of residency, it did not erase them. Borrowing Jordan’s sweater did not mean Payton had moved into Martin’s house, sleeping on his couch did not make her tenant, and taking an occasional driving lesson from him did not make Martin a parental figure. 

No Keys to Consent: The Implied Permission Argument

The Plaintiffs' second argument of implied consent was met with similar rejection. They argued Martin’s hidden keys and lax supervision suggested he was fine with Payton or Jordan taking his truck as they pleased. Justice Mandziuk found the keys being stashed in a kitchen cupboard did not communicate “help yourself,” nor did Martin’s occasional driving lessons with Payton equal a green light for midnight joyrides. He pointed out that neither Payton nor Jordan had a full license, and Martin had never allowed unsupervised driving. If anything, the hidden keys suggested the opposite of consent; they were hidden precisely because Martin did not want the truck used without his permission.

Foreseeability ≠ Consent

Rowan highlights that implied consent does not stretch to cover every foreseeable misuse of a vehicle. Just because an owner could have guessed someone might take their vehicle, it does not mean they approved of it; quoting Justice Mandziuk, “The mere foreseeability of unauthorized use is not enough to saddle the owner with liability.” Otherwise, every parent, uncle, or friend who left keys unattended would be on the hook for every reckless and unauthorized use of their vehicle. 

Key Takeaway: When Does Liability Attach?

In summary, to be held vicariously liable, owners must have some meaningful connection to the driver’s actions, whether through cohabitation, explicit permission, or behaviour so permissive it amounts to a tacit “yes.”