When the party’s over: Does a social host owe a duty of care to a co-tenant for injuries suffered when assaulted by a party guest? 

Case Citation: Peterson v Anderson, 2025 NSSC 186

BACKGROUND

On December 1, 2019 SK held a party for varsity athletes from the men’s and women’s sports teams. The host, the injured tenant, and the guests were all students at Dalhousie University. The host and the injured person lived together in a houseshare arrangement, in a property owned by the host’s parents. During the party a guest, AA, pushed a tenant, RP down the stairs. RP was a housmate, but not a party attendee.

RP sued both SK and AA alleging both were liable for his injuries. He alleged SK ought to have foreseen in advance that a party with numerous attendees and unmonitored alcohol consumption could result in his personal injury, and should have put rules in place to control guests’ behavior.

He alleged negligence and intentional battery against AA. AA claimed he held his foot out to keep RP away and that RP lost balance when he came into contact with AA’s outstretched leg.

The matter proceeded to a liability-only trial.

KEY FACTS

RP was not at the party, he was in his room with the door locked wearing noise cancelling headphones working on a paper. He drank no alcohol. Around midnight he was disturbed by noise and left his room to find a fight in full swing. He tried to get the partygoers out of the house and was mostly successful. He returned to find AA with another man at the top of the stairs and asked them to leave. RP started up the staircase when AA held out his left leg and kicked him, causing RP to fall down the stairs and to hit his head. As AA left the house he deliberately stamped on RP’s ankle.

SK was the sole host of the party with ultimate control over the event.  She did not provide any alcohol to guests, or monitor any guests’ alcohol consumption. At around 11:30-12pm she went to bed.

AA agreed SK had no role in his personal choice about his own alcohol consumption, or his choice to extend his leg towards RP while on the stairs. The Court rejected AA’s argument that this was a defensive move: RP was below him on the stairs, stationary, and AA was with another man, so RP was outnumbered.

Prior to the party RP and other housemates had raised concerns to SK about the number of attendees and possibility of damage to property. They had persuaded her to sign an agreement stating “I Sydney Kenney take full responsibility for any damages, broken/stollen [sic] items and will clean-up after my party on December 1st – 2nd, 2019”. The document did not refer to personal injury.

LAW AND ANALYSIS - SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY

The Court confirmed the general principle that there is no categorical duty of care owed by a party host to their guests: Childs v Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18 (“Childs”). Holding a private party in which alcohol is served is insufficient to implicate the host in the creation of a risk sufficient to give rise to a duty of care to third parties who may be subsequently injured by the conduct of a guest, and more is required to establish a danger or risk that requires positive action.

The Court must therefore decide whether a “novel duty of care” exists, using the Anns/Cooper two-stage test. 

At stage-one a positive duty of care may exist if foreseeability of harm is present and if there is sufficient proximity between the parties. If the plaintiff is successful at stage one, a prima facie duty of care is established, and the burden shifts to the defendant to negate the duty by residual policy considerations. In Childs three such situations were identified: where the defendant intentionally attracts and invites third parties to an inherent and obvious risk that he or she has created or controls, e.g. a boat captain owes a duty to take reasonable care to rescue a passenger who falls overboard, and the operator of a dangerous inner-tube sliding competition owes a duty to exclude people who cannot safely participate. The duty turns on the defendant’s causal relationship to the origin of the risk of injury faced by the plaintiff or on steps taken to invite others to subject themselves to a risk under the defendant’s control. If the defendant creates a risky situation and invites others into it, failure to act thereafter does not immunize the defendant from the consequences of its acts. The second situation (paternalistic relationships of supervision and control, e.g. parent-child/teacher-student) and third situation (defendants who either exercise a public function or engage in a commercial enterprise that includes implied responsibilities to the public) have no application.

RP relied on the “responsibility agreement” signed by SK in advance of the party as evidence that it was foreseeable that damage and harm could occur at a house party with unmonitored alcohol consumption and an unknown number of invitees. SK argued that it was not foreseeable that personal injury would occur to a non-party attendee, perpetrated by a party attendee who was a stranger to RP. It was not foreseeable that AA would act with aggression or intent to injure a resident of the house.

On the particular facts the Court found agreement was not relevant to the foreseeability analysis: it did not refer to personal injury. Regardless, foreseeability is an objective test and what the housemates subjectively foresaw is not relevant. The Christmas party had taken place previously without incident and without anyone being hurt. The police were often called to respond to noise complaints but that was different from the police showing up to a physical fight. “Reasonable foreseeability cannot be grounded in individuals being concerned that something could go wrong. More is required. Just because a harm is possible does not mean it is reasonably foreseeable.” 

The Court found SK’s party did not constitute an “inherent and obvious risk” for the purpose of the Anns/Cooper test. While SK was an irresponsible host, becoming intoxicated throughout the party and going to bed while the party was in full swing, abdicating her responsibilities as host, nothing she did created more of a risk than a normal house party. The “something more” required to establish a danger or risk that requires positive action was missing. The second stage of the test was therefore not triggered.

Moreover, again relying on Childs, all parties involved were autonomous adults: “A person who accepts an invitation to attend a private party does not park his autonomy at the door. The guest remains responsible for his or her conduct.” (Childs, para 45).

LAW AND ANALYSIS - OCCUPIERS’ LIABILITY

RP also relied on the Occupier's Liability Act to allege liability against SK, for failing to meet her duty of care to ensure his reasonable safety on the premises. This duty, similar to in Alberta, extends to the activities conducted on the premises and the conduct of third parties on the premises. 

However the Court confirmed a defendant will only be held responsible for failing to prevent damage caused by the intentional tort of a third party in narrow circumstances; either via a special relationship between the defendant and plaintiff or an element of control over the third party by the occupier. No "special relationship” was present. SK did not owe RP a duty of care regarding the conduct of third parties.

CONCLUSION

SK was not responsible for any injury suffered by RP as a result of AA’s actions either in negligence or pursuant to occupier’s liability legislation.  She could not have foreseen that AA would push or kick RP in the manner he did.  AA committed the tort of intentional battery by pushing RP and causing him to fall. He was also liable in negligence to RP for his actions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The case continues the line of Canadian cases which confirm the general principle that there is no categorical duty of care owed by a party host to their guests. Liability will only be extended where the defendant intentionally attracts and invites third parties to an inherent and obvious risk that he or she has created or controls.
• Further, liability for actions of third parties under the occupier’s liability legislation likewise requires special relationship between the defendant and plaintiff or some element of control over the third party.